

medical care, a sincerely gentle and caring approach to care with sensitivity rather than routine politeness being the order of the day combined with evidence-based practice. It is apparent that while we have long recognized the importance of providing respectful treatment and care and have gone far in introducing systems which encourage such approaches, we are still grappling with the effective application of this fundamental tenant in many parts of the world, both developed and developing.

*See also:* Ecology and Health; Health Education and Health Promotion; Health in Developing Countries: Cultural Concerns

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B. Chalmers

## Globalization and World Culture

### 1. Globalization and the Construction of World Culture

Globalization involves expanding worldwide flows of material objects and symbols, and the proliferation of organizations and institutions of global reach that structure those flows. World culture refers to the cultural complex of foundational assumptions, forms of knowledge, and prescriptions for action that underlie globalized flows, organizations, and institutions. It encompasses webs of significance that span the globe, conceptions of world society and world order, and models and methods of organizing social life that are assumed to have worldwide significance or applicability.

While many types of global flows have been rising cyclically for centuries, it was only in the second half of the nineteenth century that a transnational cultural

complex took a sufficiently organized form to constitute an emerging world culture. The primary locus of this nascent world culture was Europe, particularly the powerful Western European countries whose empires extended to most corners of the globe. Europeans promoted political and philosophical principles, societal and individual goals, modes of organizing, and ways of conceiving and manipulating reality that they deemed universally applicable. Epitomized above all by technical and scientific principles and practical knowledge presumed to be invariant across time and space, emerging world culture also included more historically bound constructs and ideologies, such as nationalism, citizenship, and individualism. This early version of world culture, more properly called ‘transeuropean’ culture, was carried far and wide by missionaries, traders, military expeditions, colonialists, intellectuals, and travelers.

In this same period, transnational organizations and global structures emerged with increasing frequency, eventually to form a structural backbone or framework for world culture. The vast majority of these transnational organizations were products of international or global ‘civil society’—voluntary associations founded and operated by individuals from many countries to pursue specific goals through democratically coordinated action. Typical early examples include the International Charity Association (1855), the International Sugar Union (1864), the Scandinavian Dental Association (1866), the Permanent International Committee of Architects (1867), and the International Meteorological Organization (1873). By the 1890s, such international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) were appearing at the rate of more than 10 per year, across a wide range of social sectors, drawing participants mainly from Europe and North America but also from Latin American and some Asian countries, particularly India. These bodies defined themselves as global actors and sponsored periodic conferences at which universalistic issues, problems, methods, and solutions were proposed and debated. They came to constitute a formalized global public realm in which world culture was defined, documented, elaborated, and propagated to what the growing number of participants in this public realm were beginning to think of as a single world society.

The calamitous world wars of the twentieth century severely interrupted world-cultural structuration, but after each war the process rebounded quickly. States became increasingly engaged in transnational cooperative relationships through intergovernmental organizations (IGOs, which were rare before 1920). After World War II, the IGO population burgeoned to a total of several hundred organizations, while the number of INGOs soared into the thousands. This expanding complex of global organizations came to center on the United Nations, whose agencies and programs became axes of global governance

regimes in such major institutional areas as education, health, and development.

Until the 1970s, the content of world culture remained primarily Anglo-European, increasingly dominated by the USA. American popular culture and products proliferated throughout the globe—rock music, soap operas, bluejeans, Coca-Cola, fast foods, Hollywood movies. The globalization of tastes in food, dress, and music also promoted a global identity model, that of the freely choosing, pleasure-seeking consumer. At a deeper level, the plethora of global organizations, both nongovernmental and intergovernmental, produced a range of standardized principles, models, and methods for the organization of social life. For example, a basic world model of the modern nation-state crystallized, stipulating that the state was to be responsible not only for internal order and external defense but also for building a modern society and promoting citizen welfare and civic engagement. States were therefore expected to generate national educational systems, health care programs, retirement and unemployment insurance schemes, and cultural promotion programs, among many other duties. In particular sectors, globally legitimated models emerged to guide states in meeting these responsibilities, such as the standardized educational models that took shape under UNESCO's aegis in collaboration with a range of educational INGOs. Despite enormous variation in national circumstances and resources, states have implemented these models in remarkably uniform ways.

By the 1980s, world-cultural structuration had produced largely standardized global models for an enormous range of activities—in science, medicine, health, business, technology, even recreation and leisure (sports, tourism, entertainment). Pushed by the carriers of these models, including INGOs and IGOs but also business consultants, technical advisers, and academic consultants who explain and interpret the models, states, local governments, corporations, social movement organizations, and many other types of social units go to considerable lengths to keep up with the leading edges of world-cultural development. The net result is a tremendous force for the homogenization of the world.

## 2. Globalization and Cultural Differentiation

World culture is not only a homogenizing force; it also engenders and supports diversity and differentiation. Recognition of this feature of world culture was slow in coming; through the 1970s, most analysts interpreted globalization as essentially equivalent to homogenizing Americanization. Five factors are important for understanding world culture's promotion of heterogeneity; ironically, several of these are also important elements of world culture's homogenizing capacity.

(a) *Success of the nation-state political form.* Rapid decolonization after 1945 produced a world organized almost entirely as independent states. Most new states have eagerly joined global governance organizations, debating and helping to shape agreements expressing world-culture principles and prescriptions. Citizens of the new countries became avid joiners of INGOs, expanding the range of their memberships much faster than citizens of older countries. Thus, the voices and views of the Third World are increasingly prominent in world-cultural development, and debates about proper social organization and action are often less consensual than in the past. Cultural controversy has been especially acute in such domains as women's rights, environmentalism, and human rights.

(b) *Cultural relativism and the ideology of cultural authenticity.* Intellectual movements in the social sciences and humanities, coupled with the ideologies of nationalism and national self-determination, have made the principle of the fundamentally equal value of all human cultures a central assumption of world culture. Ethnocentrism has come to be seen as both trap and injustice; tolerance and, indeed, the championing of difference occupy the moral high ground. Of particular moral virtue in contemporary world culture are the poor, the excluded, the oppressed—marginal peoples whose right to their own cultures has been violated by the onslaught of globalization (some see this as a return of 'noble savage' idealization). This universalistic form of particularism impels peoples to emphasize or invent tradition and distinctiveness in counterpoint to universalistic world-cultural principles that are supposed to operate uniformly in all places. In Western societies, such particularism is stimulated by cosmopolitan connoisseurs seeking authentically exotic cuisine or ethnically distinct 'world' music, as the genre is known. At the same time, politically astute groups understand the power of purported cultural authenticity as a fulcrum for prying rewards from global systems, so distinction and difference have become strategic resources for collective mobilization. In consequence, ethnonationalist movements of many sorts (Basques, Bretons, Croats, Eritreans, Quebecois, Scots, Tamils, etc.) and multiculturalist restructuring by states, churches, schools, and other organizations have become the order of the day.

(c) *Regionalism.* Roughly half of the international organizations founded since 1950 have been regional in scope, activating European, Latin American, Asian, francophone, Islamic, Andean, and many other sub-global identities. Like ethnonationalism, regionalism has flourished in the wake of world-cultural intensification. Global structures, ideologies, principles, and models provide an overarching framework of commonality and shared meaning for disparate social units. With the framework well in place, diverse regional organizations and movements have expanded to implement, modify, and argue about the frame-

work's content and implications. We see the same process at work within international organizations and global corporations. For example, Cable News Network International (CNNI) began as a unitary organization bringing a standardized English-language product to televisions around the world, but it eventually established numerous regional centers producing local-language broadcasting adapted to specific target audiences.

(d) *Consumerism as adaptive interpretation.* While global popular culture contains products and symbols that penetrate most local markets, its accompanying ideology of economic freedom and consumer choice encourages varied uses and interpretations of standardized consumption patterns. For instance, consumers in Hong Kong might appreciate a McDonald's restaurant as much for its clean facilities as for its food. They expect fast, not smiling, service, and reserve the right to eat at their leisure. In a city pressed for space, the restaurant can become a gathering spot for youth or a favored locale for birthday parties. By adapting marketing to local attitudes, McDonald's has lost its foreign aura, blending into Hong Kong's diverse, cosmopolitan culinary scene. In Beijing, meanwhile, McDonald's American origins can be attractive to upwardly mobile Chinese as a symbol of participation in global society, but among many Koreans in Seoul those same origins evoke criticism. While not denying the power of multinational corporations to foster acceptance of their products and logos, recent research suggests that they must take into account the distinctive tastes of potentially fickle consumers. Popular culture increasingly creates global tastes, but it also creates critical consumers who keep this culture from becoming entirely uniform.

(e) *Creolization.* In many domains, the homogenizing force of world culture encounters ingrained local tastes and traditions, which may in turn be the residue of earlier such encounters with neighbors or colonizers. Due to creative interaction processes, common elements take different forms in different places. The spread of world culture therefore produces not homogeneity but new cultural melanges, each 'creolized' in its own way. A case in point is West-African popular music. Popular styles that themselves are blends of variegated traditions (Brazilian, blues, British rock) become the ingredients of new and distinctive styles. Adapting indigenous instruments or rhythms, African musicians participate in a global musical movement. Cultural flows come from many directions, intersect in unpredictable ways, and continue on in new forms to yet other places. How they continue, and the publics they eventually reach, depend in part on the global commercial media system's marketing and genre-promotion efforts, but that system is only one factor shaping local aesthetic orientations. Moreover, commercial interests have much to gain from promoting diversity. Thus, as new musical or other fads make their way across the globe, they produce new forms of

localized diversity and unforeseen local reactions and interpretations. In the expressive realm, the varied forms of local-global interaction are not inexorably yielding to a standardized, stifling, hegemonic world culture.

### 3. *Dimensions of World Culture*

Most discussions of world culture focus on its expressive or normative dimensions. Expressive (popular) culture includes media products, consumable goods that assume iconic status as symbols of modernity or avant-gardism, foods and clothing styles originating in particular cultures that become worldwide fads, and so on. Normative culture comprises the values and goals promoted by global corporations and organizations—fetishistic consumerism and capital accumulation, individualism and human rights, democracy and political participation, gender and racial equality. The expressive dimension has received the greatest attention, particularly with respect to the global popularity of American films, television shows, sports figures, and lifestyle elements. Some scholars decry the obliteration of local cultures; others argue in favor of creative interpretation and adaptation, as local cultures integrate new cultural elements while retaining their basic identities (hybridization or creolization). Similarly, analysts decry some aspects of normative cultural globalization and praise others, often sharply disagreeing about the desirability of particular global norms and values and disagreeing as well about the extent to which a global normative consensus is emerging or even possible.

Less attention has been paid to the ontological and cognitive dimensions of world culture. At the ontological level, the reorganization of social life in accordance with dominant world-cultural models engenders increasing individualism, the disenchantment of nature, reliance on rationalized images of society, and an action-oriented model of the individual. Put another way, world-cultural penetration changes prevailing views of 'the nature of things,' promoting the worldview that underlies such major modern institutions as formal education, experimental science, national accounting and statistical systems, and advanced-technology engineering. These and similar institutional complexes bring with them broad bodies of knowledge and distinctive cognitive styles, but the depth of cultural reconstruction they engender remains largely unexamined because few attempts have been made to come to grips with their cultural implications. Science, mathematics, bookkeeping, organizational structure, technology, tools, construction materials, land surveying—all these have achieved the status of almost unassailably universalistic activities, uninteresting because they are mundane, routine, matter-of-fact. Thus, these highly formalized arenas seldom become the focus of ideological debate,

with the notable exceptions of such issues as nuclear power, genetically modified organisms, global warming, and large dams. The most highly institutionalized forms of cultural globalization remain largely invisible.

#### *4. Globalization and Cultural Conflict*

World culture engenders conflict in world society through a process that has, as it were, turned the West against itself. By the 1970s, when scores of new states had formed in Africa and Asia, vociferous opposition to continued economic and cultural domination by Western countries (labeled neocolonialism and cultural imperialism, originally formulated in the West) began to penetrate global organizations, especially UN bodies. Various associations of less developed countries called for a restructuring of world society—a New World Economic Order and a New World Information Order that would put restraints on the operations of transnational corporations and shift resources to the poorer countries. Former colonies began assertively invoking world-cultural principles of equality and development as basic human rights. Further tensions arose as the global human rights sector (itself increasingly involving individuals and groups from outside the West) turned its scrutiny on the new states, decrying their selective championing of certain global universals while ignoring or severely violating others, especially those relating to the integrity and political participation of citizens. Thus, both the particularism of world culture (the moral legitimacy attributed to national or ethnic units) and its universalism (the insistence that all units abide by basic principles and values) yield forms of disagreement and conflict that would not emerge in a less globalized world.

As non-Western cultures and regions have become more prominent in the world polity, it makes increasing sense to speak of world cultures (in the plural) rather than a singular world culture. Dominant Western models have penetrated deeply in most places, but they have also evoked resistance as well as efforts to revivify and globalize alternative models. Most notable in this regard is the assertiveness of Islamic cultural carriers, particularly since the 1970s. Many Muslim leaders and organizations promote a societal model that infuses the state with religious precepts and recasts the relationship between state and citizen (codified in 1981 as the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights). African and Asian models of social organization and development have also emerged, and some observers argue that conflict in the twenty-first century will revolve primarily around grand civilizational axes rather than the nation-state clashes that have dominated in recent centuries.

By the same token, more fine-grained analyses of world culture(s) identify multiple models of central

world-cultural constructs. For example, derived from the Western tradition are liberal, socialist, corporate, and welfare models of the state; from Asian sources, quasifamilial and state-led development models. Multiple models of the individual, the business enterprise, and the national polity are further examples. World-cultural complexity has increased rapidly in recent decades, perhaps most sharply since the collapse of Communism and the end of the Cold War, as ever more cultural centers generate more alternative cultural constructions. Poorer and more peripheral societies are less able to bring their cultural models to the world-cultural table, but many participants in the global arena from richer societies have become strong advocates of the poor and peripheral, helping to ensure that world culture becomes yet more complex and incoherent but also more significant for national and local structuration and change.

#### *5. Religion and World Culture*

Since the early period of European expansion, many of the symbolic flows, organizing institutions, and foundational assumptions that constitute world culture have been religious in origin. Through conquest, evangelization, and migration, Europeans made much of the world 'safe for Christianity,' giving emerging world culture a distinctively Christian cast even though most of the world did not become Christian. In the current phase of cultural globalization, the overall role of religious institutions may have diminished but various religious actors on the global stage vitally affect world culture in new ways, notably by providing alternative worldviews. Religious globalization has been important in constructing world culture, contributing to its heterogeneity, and producing new forms of conflict, as explained below.

Religion played a distinctive role in the construction of world culture, providing motivation for some globalizers and legitimating the actions of others. It also contributed to the foundations of contemporary world culture. The conception of societal progress that prevails almost everywhere stems in part from the Christian legitimation of rational world mastery; the global view of the individual as agent and citizen similarly has roots in Christian views of the person; the global script for organizing society in a rational-legal manner and legitimating authority voluntaristically derives indirectly from Christian precedents. More concretely, missionaries not only spread their faith, they also provided education and health care in far-flung places, diffusing secular commitments that since have become globally entrenched. Their actions prefigured the efforts of later movements in global civil society referred to above. Today distinctly religious views are less obviously influential in world culture, yet they still shape its evolution. According to some, a vigorous Pentecostal movement, successfully expand-

ing to Latin America, Asia, and Africa, carries with it the 'American' gospel of material success and individual well-being, thus supporting global corporate culture. The World Council of Churches, others argue, contributed centrally to global environmental concerns with its initiative on 'Justice, Peace, and the Integrity of Creation,' launched in 1983.

Religion's promotion of world-cultural heterogeneity reflects in part the increasing prominence of Third World voices in global religious organizations. Pope John Paul II has appointed a record number of non-Western bishops and cardinals. In the Anglican Church, non-Westerners significantly aid opposition to gay rights. Non-Western Pentecostals have not only grown dramatically in numbers, they have also devised their own spiritual practices to suit local circumstances. Cho Yong-Gi, pastor of the large Yoido Full Gospel Church in Seoul, initiated a world mission program that has sent hundreds of missionaries and established seminaries in several developed countries, including the USA.

Religion's relation to cultural relativism, another aspect of heterogeneity, varies greatly by tradition and is therefore more complex. In some cases, such as that of Hindu nationalism, religion becomes the primary vehicle for expressions of national distinctiveness. While few Christian churches accept the equal value of all cultures, many have in fact accommodated major cultural differences within loose doctrinal parameters. In Korea and Brazil, for instance, Pentecostal churches incorporate elements of traditional non-Christian spirituality. Islamic fundamentalism presents yet another variant, claiming global legitimacy for its defense of 'authentic' Islam while rejecting the value of other traditions. Finally, religion helps to promote heterogeneity through the creolization process mentioned earlier. Pentecostalism is once again a case in point. An American-inspired movement with a core evangelical message and a secular commitment to material progress has become a mosaic of styles and practices as local congregations have adapted global models to their own needs without direct outside control. As new global movements make inroads in 'national' religious traditions, they produce new juxtapositions that creolize religious cultures. Of course, this process is not unprecedented. Many successful religious traditions have balanced universal ambition with local creativity to produce hybrid religiosity 'on the ground' in counterpoint to unification at the doctrinal level.

Religion also contributes to world-cultural pluralism and conflict. Religious traditions contain diverse views of the good society, leading to varying interpretations of seemingly shared global values. Some view the dominant form of world culture as a coercive, Christian-biased Western force that threatens the integrity of their own traditions. Islamic fundamentalists oppose what they perceive as a godless consumer culture that undermines people's faith and

serves the political interests of the West. Pope John Paul II has criticized an amoral, neoliberal world order that puts profits ahead of the needs of the poor.

Specific elements of world culture also provoke distinctly religious opposition. In recent decades, for example, the principle that women are citizens—individuals to be granted equal rights and opportunities—has been institutionalized in world culture. Within many traditions, however, equality for women is problematic. The result is severe contestation of women's equality in some places, most notably by the Taliban in Afghanistan. These religiously inspired actors have helped generate a more general backlash against globalization, even while they accept many basic elements of world culture. Religion becomes a vantage point from which to oppose the threat represented by globalization as such. The struggle, as some groups see it, is between globalization and their cultural survival.

In sum, religion is a central aspect of cultural globalization, as traditions spread, transnational networks expand, national cultures become more mixed, and new ways of experiencing the world emerge. In many countries, religion mediates the pluralizing effect of world culture. It plays an important role in the intense contest concerning global values and world order. Yet the construction of world culture has become a mainly secular process; it has no transcendent content in the conventional sense. Cultural heterogeneity and conflict themselves take many forms, only some of them religious. While world religion is intimately connected with globalization and involved in the latter's dynamics, it is by no means a dominant force. Whether it can, or should, take on a greater role in defining the desirable world order is likely to be a central issue in future global cultural contestation.

*See also:* Capitalism: Global; Globality; Globalization, Anthropology of; Imperialism: Political Aspects; United Nations: Political Aspects; Values, Anthropology of

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J. Boli and F. J. Lechner

## Globalization, Anthropology of

### 1. The Disciplinary Context

Anthropological interest in globalization is difficult to trace precisely but can be recognized as early as Appadurai's work on the global cultural economy (1990, 1996), Hannerz's analysis of cultural complexity and creolization (1987, 1992), and Friedman's work linking global capitalism and cultural processes (1988, 1994), all of which built on earlier anthropological interest in cultural exchange and world systems. From the start, such work has been part of two sets of scholarly exchanges and debates. The first links anthropology with a wider debate about globalization in other social science fields, notably geography, political science, and sociology. The other is internal to anthropology and links it to longstanding concerns with diffusion, comparison, ethnography, and the study of large-scale historical change. A brief look at each of these contexts might help to frame the anthropological perspective on globalization.

As regards the social sciences in general, anthropologists in the late 1980s found themselves, like many

other scholars, trying to understand the processes that led to the breakdown of the Soviet world and to guess at the shape of things to come. They soon found themselves having to engage powerful perspectives on the emergent world order, which came out of the Marxist tradition in geography (exemplified by Harvey 1989), by a renewed interest in global political culture, exemplified by the polemical and much discussed work of Samuel Huntington (1996), and some prescient studies of the new forms being taken by global capitalism in the last decades of the twentieth century (Lash and Urry 1987). In addition, anthropologists found themselves in a rich, sometimes competitive dialogue with scholars in literary and cultural studies, notably those influenced by British cultural Marxism, and most powerfully represented by Stuart Hall (1986). In addition, the publication of Benedict Anderson's landmark study of nationalism (1983) provoked a strikingly wide debate about the links between politics, the imagination, and national identification. These stimuli helped to shape anthropological research on globalization, which in many ways is marked by the ongoing effort to link broad structures and processes in the world economy to the subtleties of communication, interpretation, and translation that govern everyday life in all societies.

Within anthropology, the study of globalization built on several well-established currents of interest. In the United States, the study of globalization fit well with Boasian traditions in the study of diffusion, cultural change, and culture contact and with a longstanding interest in urban settings and complex societies. In Europe, anthropologists were slower to take an interest in globalization, but here too longstanding interests in problems of scale, social cohesion, and structural change made globalization a subject of growing interest after 1990. In other parts of the world, such as Latin America, Africa, and India, the anthropological interest in globalization was more closely linked to problems of ethics, development, and inequality.

In spite of these various currents of research and theorization within which the anthropological interest in globalization has developed, from the beginning there were serious doubts about whether globalization by its nature was a topic suitable to the special strengths of anthropology in the study of intimate social relations and of societies governed by non-market social principles. Many of these anxieties have been translated into methodological concerns, reflected in a significant body of methodological work about how anthropology ought to address the emergent world of globalization (e.g., Fox 1991). There is still a considerable body of opinion among professional anthropologists that globalization may well be a mere trend, an artifact of academic fashion, and that in any case, it is not an ideal subject for anthropological research because of its conceptual and social scale. But this rearguard anxiety, not always easy to distinguish